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The most credible findings concerning human behavior are 
proposed by experimental sciences such as psychology. The 
key aspects of the research carried out at the Faculty of Law 
and Administration at the Jagiellonian University (within the grant 
“Naturalization of Law”) were precisely the determination of such 
findings in experimental sciences that are important to law, and, 
last but not least, finding a way to apply them in legal sciences. 
The goal of the naturalization of law is to consolidate the legal 
image of a man with its scientific counterpart. For example, in the 
fields of psychology and cognitive neuroscience, the thesis 
about the illusion of free choice is becoming increas-
ingly popular. This illusion means that even 
in the situations when we are convinced 
that only we make our own choices, 
it is only an illusion generated by 
our minds. In fact, the decision 
had been made unconsciously, 
before we even started consid-
ering it. At the same time, the 
ability to make free choices 
is a prerequisite for holding 
someone criminally liable for 
an action. If, however, free 
choice is merely an illusion, can 
anybody be deemed responsible 
for his/her actions?
 How to link the law 
 with the empirical sciences? 
The project is carried out by twenty scientists 
representing not only the legal sciences, but also phi-
losophy, psychology, and neuroscience. The research is divided 
into two stages: the first stage consists 
of the analysis of existing models of the 
“naturalization” of law. 
Lawyers recognized the importance 
of behavioral sciences as early as the 19th 
century, i.e., when psychology and sociol-
ogy became independent sciences. These 
attempts at the “scientification” of law 
proved to be misguided for two reasons. Firstly, the sciences that 
were referred to were very immature in those days – psychology 
of that period was still a highly philosophical discipline, based on 
unverified assumptions that were even empirically unverifiable. 
Secondly, the existing models of “naturalization” of the law, even 
modern ones, are based on numerous simplifications resulting 
from the lack of actual cooperation among representatives of vari-
ous fields of science. Some of these models are biased, as they are 
based on the findings from only one field of science, which is often 
evolutionary psychology. On the other hand, other models are 
often too radical because they reject the traditional 
philosophical method of conceptual analysis 
(this is proposed by Brian Leiter, a popular 
modern philosopher of law). 
An important step at this stage 
of the research is the presenta-
tion of a new, interdisciplinary 
model of the “naturalization” 
of law. “Naturalization” of law 
consists mainly of the devel-
opment of methods of appli-
cation the findings of empirical 
sciences in the science of law. 
The model of such naturalization 
should take into account particular-
ly the difference between normative 
systems (of which law is a specific in-
stance) and the descriptive field, analyzing 
the sciences that deal with human behavior. 
Law is a system of norms telling us how we should 
act, while experimental sciences describe and interpret ac-
tual behavior. Thus, a naturalistic fallacy sneaks in between the 
In the eyes of a philosopher, law is something more than 
provisions listed in codes. It also includes a series of hidden 
assumptions concerning human behavior, which may 
be described by the term “the legal image of a man.” Such 
assumptions constitute the basis of operation for numerous 
legal institutions.
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legal and experimental sciences: the fact that we behave in a giv-
en way cannot constitute the basis for the claim that we should 
behave in such way. For example, if scientists prove that people, 
in general, act egoistically, it does not mean that they should be-
have in this way and that the law should permit or even promote 
such behavior. However, the law should not be completely indif-
ferent to the determination of the ways in which we do actually 
behave, due to the obvious principle stating that if an individual is 
unable to behave in a certain way, then the law should not require 
such behavior. Let us imagine a situation when someone is watch-
ing a drowning person from the shore of a lake. The law should not 
require such an observer to dive into the water and save the drown-
ing man if the observer cannot swim. 
Apart from this aspect of the “naturalization” of law, it is also 
crucial to provide an answer to the question concerning the 
method of conducting this type of research: should the method 
of conceptual analysis traditionally used in the philosophy of law be 
replaced, at least to some extent, with the experimental method, 
which obviously provides more reliable knowledge? 
 Eliminating discrepancies 
What seems particularly interesting is that the scientists also intend 
to indicate those findings of experimental sciences that are 
significant for legal sciences due to their inconsistencies with 
some of the assumptions that constitute the foundations of the 
legal system. An example might be the thesis about the illusion 
of free choice discussed above. Another example refers to the 
decision-making model adopted in the law. The law assumes 
such a model for example with regard to consumers’ decisions 
to buy a certain product. In some legal systems, this model as-
sumes strong rationality in the decision-making process on the 
part of consumers. As a result, consumer protection under such 
systems is limited. However, if it is proven that consumers buy 
without much thought, driven by emotions, should they be better 
protected because of that?
The analyses will focus particularly on the findings of psychol-
ogy and neuroscience. In the last few decades, these disciplines 
have significantly contributed to the change in the scientific image 
of a man, especially in connection to his decision-making process, 
the nature of reasoning, or cognitive control. 
A key element of this stage of the research will be to reconstruct 
“the legal image of a man.” The analysis will examine specific legal 
notions: a statement of will, person, or responsibility. Assumptions 
connected with these notions will be revealed, followed by the 
analysis of the compliance of these assumptions with the current 
state of knowledge concerning, among others, decision-making, 
reasoning and cognitive control. In this context, the solutions will 
also be shown, which will make the “the legal image of a man” 
more consistent with its scientific counterpart. 
The results of the research will consist of, first of all, a proposal 
of solutions to a series of problems connected with the application 
of experimental sciences in the field of law. These issues are par-
ticularly connected to the method of application of these sciences 
in the reflection on the law. However, the results will also include 
several modifications of certain solutions proposed by the legal 
sciences in accordance with the current state of knowledge about 
humans, i.e., the “humanization” of law. It is likely that the results 
will allow for a proposal of specific legal solutions that could be 
included in the existing legal system. Such solutions may concern 
not only the scope of legal protection of consumers discussed 
earlier, or the grounds for criminal liability, but also such areas 
of civil law as contract law or compensation liability. 
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